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Optimal Antimicrobial Use
under Countervailing Externalities
Anthony R. Delmond and Haseeb Ahmed
Over- or underprovision of antimicrobials under free-riding and resistance externalities can be
economically important through their impacts on animal health, human health, and food security.
This paper models antimicrobial use given disease dynamics with (i) free-riding incentives and (ii)
antimicrobial resistance. Our results suggest a strong potential for overprovision of antimicrobials
when ignoring resistance dynamics. Numerical simulation indicates an increase in the cost of
disease management with increases in resistance levels. Policy implications are discussed in the
context of animal health and disease-control subsidy programs in the developing world as well as
unregulated sale of antimicrobials.
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Introduction
Livestock owners use antimicrobials (antibiotics, acaricides, and other antiparasitic agents) for
disease prevention and treatment. However, the use of antimicrobials, especially for prophylaxis
and subclinical disease management, can be suboptimal due to free-riding incentives (Bauch and
Earn, 2004; Gramig, Horan, and Wolf, 2009; Hennessy and Wolf, 2018). Further, limited access to
veterinary services, low availability of antimicrobials, and credit constraints also can hamper the
demand for antimicrobials, especially in smallholder agricultural households (Marsh et al., 2016;
Caudell et al., 2017; Railey et al., 2018). Given that livestock health has economic, food security,
and public health implications, some governments have designed subsidy programs to promote
antimicrobial use in the livestock sector to overcome access and free-rider problems (Maziku,
Mruttu, and Tegegn, 2016; Mwaseba and Kigoda, 2017).
Since access, availability, and free ridership are not the only problems associated with
antimicrobial use, subsidy programs that promote antimicrobial use in agriculture may end up having
unintended consequences. The costs of morbidity and mortality have been increasing worldwide,
largely owing to antimicrobial resistance (Laxminarayan et al., 2016), and the use of veterinary
antimicrobials in livestock can be important contributors to the emergence and transmission of
antimicrobial resistance (Carlet et al., 2012; Van Boeckel et al., 2015; Ahmed et al., 2018).
Since private decision makers may not account for the external costs imposed on other livestock
owners through resistance, they may overuse antimicrobials from a social economic perspective,
exacerbating the emergence of antimicrobial resistance (Brown and Layton, 1996; Laxminarayan
and Brown, 2001; Secchi and Babcock, 2002; Althouse, Bergstrom, and Bergstrom, 2010).
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This paper examines the optimal level of preventive antimicrobial use in agriculture under free-
riding incentives and antimicrobial effectiveness in the context of smallholders in a developing
country. We focus on a smallholder setting since commercial farms may have easy access to
antimicrobials (commonly used for prophylaxis and growth promotion) and less incentive to free
ride given their share of the market. Therefore, externalities associated with drug resistance may be
more pronounced in that setting (Levy, 1998; Orzech and Nichter, 2008). However, the extent of
free ridership and resistance is rather unclear in the smallholder setting.1
Antimicrobial effectiveness is modeled as a nonrenewable resource in a dynamic optimization
framework, following the existing literature on the economics of antibiotic resistance (Laxminarayan
and Brown, 2001; Elbasha, 2003; Wilen and Msangi, 2003). The initial model of free-riding
incentives is fairly standard, and it illustrates the effects of free riding on antimicrobial use given
disease dynamics. We then add antimicrobial resistance as a dynamic constraint and compare the
two models, examining several cases conditional on the extent of both externalities. Our numerical
simulation and phase diagrams indicate that it becomes increasingly difficult to manage a steady
level of disease prevalence as levels of resistance increase. Policy implications are discussed in the
context of animal health and disease control subsidy programs of the developing world as well as
unregulated antimicrobial sales and use, which can be conceptualized as an implicit subsidy of sorts.
This article contributes to the literature in two ways. First, free-riding and resistance externalities
are modeled separately in the literature on antimicrobial use. Modeling the two separately could
lead to two types of errors in policy prescription. Only modeling access issues and the free-rider
problem could prescribe subsidization policies, which in turn lead to increased antimicrobial use
and resistance. Conversely, modeling only resistance could lead to policies that may limit or ban
the use of antimicrobials where they are necessary for disease prevention or treatment. Second, in
modeling the two externalities together in a dynamic optimization framework, the paper shows how
infection burden becomes increasingly unsustainable as levels of resistance increase, suggestive of
increasing costs of dynamic disease management under increasing resistance.
Related Literature
Explicitly modeling free-rider and resistance externalities jointly in the context of antimicrobials
(and more specifically for smallholders in the developing world) is novel, though the two
externalities have been previously modeled and discussed independently. The general free-rider
problem has featured in the literature of public choice since as early as Hume (1955, originally
published 1740), who described the complexity of procuring public goods. Wicksell (1967,
originally published 1896) and Lindahl (1967, originally published 1919) are credited with first
formalizing the problem, which has since been extended and expounded upon by Musgrave (1939),
Bowen (1943), and numerous others.
Regarding models of antibiotics and vaccination, Althouse, Bergstrom, and Bergstrom (2010)
built on the mathematical framework and economic theory of public choice introduced by Samuelson
(1954, 1955) . As in our paper, they base their model on private decision making, and their main
concern is to identify optimal allocation of public health interventions, defined as vaccinations,
antibiotics, and antivirals. They use both economic and epidemiological modeling approaches,
depending on the intervention method, but their analysis excludes prophylaxis or subclinical
disease—the main focus of this research. This eliminates the free riding associated with preventative
1 Smallholders account for about 60% of global food production and may be important contributors to antimicrobial use
and antimicrobial resistance (Graeub et al., 2016; Caudell et al., 2017). The World Bank defines smallholder farms as those
with less than 2 hectares of land. For our purposes, we define a smallholder farmer as someone with a limited number of
production animals and no market power. Indeed, we can find many countries and contexts in which such farms exist in
abundance and provide an important source of food production. For example, farmers with fewer than 11 animals produce
75% of the milk in Pakistan (FAO, 2008). Similarly, 70% of the milk consumed in Kenya comes from farms that own 2–5
cattle and produce about 5 kg of milk per day (Muriuki, 2011).
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action. Their multiple models, each illustrating a specific disease and treatment method, result in a
specific and unambiguous relationship between private and social equilibrium. Our model, however,
considers multiple equilibria based on the relative sizes of free-riding and resistance externalities,
with a focus on the specific effects of disregarding resistance dynamics, especially in a smallholder,
developing-world setting.
Our modeling approach diverges from most of the existing literature on antimicrobial resistance
dynamics, which typically utilizes an epidemiological approach to modeling (e.g., susceptible–
infected–susceptible (SIS) or susceptible–infected–recovered (SIR) models). Laxminarayan and
Brown (2001) provide a standard model in the context of antimicrobial resistance, constructing a
dynamic SIS model from a social planner’s perspective to account for antimicrobial resistance with
two drugs of differing effectiveness. The economic contribution of their paper relies on the inclusion
of constant benefit of successful treatment, measured in dollars per person, scaled by fraction of
infected who are treated and the effectiveness of treatment. Herrmann and Gaudet (2009) extend
the epidemiological SIS framework to examine antibiotic effectiveness from the perspective of
producers under open access. Similar to our model, they find that under open access and depending
on the model parameters, antibiotic efficacy could be higher or lower than the social optimum.
Unlike our model, they partition the population into susceptible and infected groups, each with their
own subgroups of those exposed to resistant and nonresistant disease strains. Their model excludes
any free-rider problem in the consumer decision-making process.
Among papers employing an alternative economic approach to modeling resistance dynamics, a
few stand out but remain different from this paper. Horowitz and Moehring (2004) model human
antibiotic use wherein a social planner maximizes social benefits—the price of antibiotics plus
a constant marginal external benefit of reducing public infection—subject to the social cost of
increasing antibiotic resistance. Herrmann and Gaudet’s (2009) intuitive approach is similar to that
of Horowitz and Moehring, but the former returns to an underlying SIS framework. In addressing
their objective to decrease antibiotic resistance through reductions in open access (via patent
extension or monopsony), Horowitz and Moehring ignore the private household decision-making
process and the free-rider problem, instead dealing exclusively with the social planner’s aggregated
welfare problem. Elbasha (2003) and Brown and Layton (1996) construct economic models of
antibiotic resistance aggregated from the private household decision. Following the basic structure
of Phelps (1989), Elbasha employs a static model to estimate the deadweight loss associated with
antibiotic overuse.
One central feature separates our paper from the models outlined above: We deal with
prophylactic rather than therapeutic antimicrobials. An existing bacterial infection requires active
treatment, hence the free-rider problem is absent in most of the above literature. Introducing an ex
ante household decision on antimicrobial use creates the additional issue of providing a public good,
which is key to this paper. Among free-rider models of disease prevention, many papers use the
context of livestock vaccination, which by its nature does not lend itself to a discussion of resistance
dynamics. Another important distinction of our model is the inclusion of a natural, external growth
rate of disease prevalence. Brown and Layton’s (1996) model of resistance dynamics, though fairly
similar in structure, ignores this element, opting instead for a single dynamic constraint that assumes
changes in bacteria’s susceptibility to antibiotics as a function of antibiotic use.
Regarding the focus on smallholder households, this was a deliberate decision serving multiple
purposes. First, the free-rider problem is more prominent where livestock ownership is more widely
distributed—a situation more representative of (though not exclusive to) developing nations. Farm
size could play a major role in individual households’ decisions about antimicrobial use, but
this paper develops only the framework that later can be modified to incorporate such additional
complexity. Second, these smallholders in the developing nations play a critical role in food
production and security and are an understudied population from the perspective of antimicrobial
use and resistance (Redding et al., 2014; Caudell et al., 2017).
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Model
We consider the privately and socially optimal use of prophylactic antimicrobials for livestock under
dynamic societal disease prevalence. First, we examine the difference between the equilibrium of
antimicrobial use between decision makers who do or do not account for the free-riding externality
when antimicrobial resistance is not included in the model. We then incorporate antimicrobial
resistance by adding a variable and dynamic constraint to the model. Our model illustrates that
individual decision makers will underprovide antimicrobials relative to the socially optimal level
when ignoring antimicrobial resistance dynamics. When the decision maker includes antimicrobial
resistance in decision making, the optimal amount of antimicrobial use could be higher or lower
than antimicrobial use when this externality was not considered, depending on the relative sizes of
free-riding and resistance externalities.
A dynamic model is preferred to mirror the ever-changing nature of disease ecology and
antimicrobial effectiveness (Herrmann and Gaudet, 2009; Viboud, Simonsen, and Chowell, 2016).
Further, a dynamic model allows us to explore the changes in steady states under different levels of
antimicrobial effectiveness. Additionally, phase diagrams help in discussing policy implications of
the likely tipping points in the disease and antimicrobial effectiveness relationship.
Model without Antimicrobial Resistance
The decision maker maximizes the expected value of their welfare over an infinite time horizon. For
livestock owners, welfare is determined largely by the health of their livestock. Suppressing other
sources of uncertainty (e.g., prices, capacity constraints, etc.) and assuming homogeneity in terms





[v(a(t) , p(t))− ca(t)]e−rtdt,
where ν (·) is the value derived from keeping livestock, a(t) is the household’s antimicrobial
use at time t, p(t) is the regional disease prevalence, r is the discount rate, and c is the cost
of antimicrobials, which is treated here as constant. Indeed, the choice of disease management
technologies is dependent on the background disease risk (Marsh et al., 2016; Ahmed et al., 2018;
Railey et al., 2018), which is captured by p(t). We assume the following intuitive relationships
between the value of keeping livestock and its arguments:
(2) va > 0, vp < 0, vaa < 0, and vap = vpa > 0.
In other words, the value of keeping livestock increases with antimicrobial use, but the magnitude
of those marginal gains decreases as antimicrobial use increases (satisfying the concavity assumption
for maxima to exist). Intuitively, the value of owning livestock decreases as the level of regional
disease prevalence increases (i.e., vp < 0). Further, we assume symmetry in cross-partial derivatives
and that the marginal value of antimicrobial use increases as societal disease prevalence increases
(vap = vpa > 0). Societal disease prevalence changes according to the following disease dynamics
constraint:
(3) ṗ = θ (a(t))δ (p(t)) ,
which is impacted by a(t), but the individual decision maker does not account for how his/her
disease control efforts affect disease ecology. The social planner, however, does take this into
account. In other words, the private decision maker and the social planner optimize the same welfare
494 September 2021 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
function but different constraints in our model.2 θ (·) represents the way antimicrobial use induces a
change in infection burden without accounting for antimicrobial resistance. We assume that θa < 0
and θaa > 0, which represents the notion that antimicrobial use reduces disease prevalence at a
decreasing rate, assuming antimicrobials remain effective. The natural growth of disease prevalence
is captured in δ (·), and this function should follow some sort of an exponential path such that
δp > 0 and δpp > 0.3 A multiplicatively separable form of the disease dynamics constraint is used
since it is highly tractable and emphasizes the different effects antimicrobial use and current levels of
prevalence can have on changes in the latter. Last, we assume the initial level of disease prevalence,
p0, is finite and known.
The private decision maker will solve the present-value maximization problem above for his
private level of antimicrobial use, a(t). That optimal level of antimicrobial use is characterized by
the maximum principle derived in Appendix A, the first-order condition of which can be rearranged
to show that the marginal value of an additional unit of private antimicrobial use is equal to its cost
(va = c). The social planner will maximize a similar equation to get optimal antimicrobial use, but
they will internalize the reduction in disease prevalence stemming from individual antimicrobial use.
The optimum is characterized by the second maximum principle derived in Appendix A, the first-
order condition of which indicates that the societal value of an additional unit of antimicrobial use is
equal to its cost plus an additional element that depends on disease prevalence and the effectiveness
of antimicrobials (va = c + λθaδ ). Comparing these two, the model demonstrates a basic free-rider
result that optimal private antimicrobial use is below the socially optimal level. This result stems
from an incentive structure under which households are not fully able to internalize the broader
welfare effects of antimicrobials. As expected, free ridership tends to underprovide antimicrobials
relative to the social optimum when ignoring resistance dynamics.
Model with Antimicrobial Resistance
To incorporate antimicrobial resistance, we modify the objective function to include an additional




[v(a(t) , p(t) , I (t))− ca(t)]e−rtdt,
where I (t) is antimicrobial ineffectiveness such that vI < 0 and vII > 0, and the other partial
derivatives defined previously remain unchanged. Higher levels of antimicrobial resistance diminish
the value of keeping livestock; however, the value decreases at a decreasing rate. We also assume the
symmetry of cross-partials holds and the intuitive relationship, vaI = vIa < 0, which indicates that as
the marginal value of antimicrobials decreases resistance increases.
Accounting for antimicrobial resistance in terms of its effects on disease prevalence, the disease
dynamics constraint becomes
(5) ṗ = θ (a(t) , I (t))δ (p(t)) .
Antimicrobial resistance affects the growth rate of disease prevalence both directly and indirectly
through its interaction with antimicrobial use. This modification of the disease dynamics constraint
illustrates the more ambiguous effect of the θ (·) function on changes in disease prevalence. An
increase in antimicrobial use decreases the growth rate of disease prevalence, while antimicrobial
resistance has an opposite effect (θa < 0, θI > 0). Further, we assume that θaa > 0 and θII > 0 (i.e.,
2 It is worth noting that the social planner does not account for resistance externalities in the first model. These externalities
are introduced later.
3 Disease prevalence is generally modeled as some sort of exponential growth function (see, e.g., Anderson, May, and
Anderson, 1992; Viboud, Simonsen, and Chowell, 2016).
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Figure 1. Illustration of the Marginal Benefit of Antimicrobial Use as a Public Good,
Accounting for Antimicrobial Resistance
an increase in antimicrobial use hampers the growth of disease at a decreasing rate and an increase
in antimicrobial ineffectiveness increases the growth of disease prevalence at an increasing rate).4
To account for an interaction between antimicrobial use and antimicrobial resistance, we make the
additional assumption that θaI = θIa < 0 (i.e., the marginal ability of antimicrobials to hamper the
growth of disease prevalence goes down as antimicrobial resistance goes up; Herrmann and Gaudet,
2009; Bloom and Cadarette, 2019).
The evolution of antimicrobial resistance is characterized by the resistance dynamics constraint,
(6) İ = ξ (a(t)) ,
where ξ (·) is the rate at which antimicrobials become ineffective, and we assume this is increasing in
antimicrobial use, such that ξa > 0 and ξaa > 0 (Van Boeckel et al., 2015, 2019). The effectiveness of
antimicrobials is nonrenewable (Laxminarayan and Brown, 2001; Elbasha, 2003; Wilen and Msangi,
2003), so the level of ineffectiveness is finite, I = [0, Ī]. The initial levels of disease prevalence and
antimicrobial ineffectiveness, p0 and I0, are assumed to be finite and known.
The maximum principles (derived in Appendix B) for each case define the respective optima
and antimicrobial use. Comparing the first-order conditions, we see that the privately optimal
antimicrobial decision (va = c) again differs from the social planner (va = c + λθa p + µξa). To
clarify our findings, we define the optimal levels of antimicrobial use derived in each model as
follows:
• a(t) represents the privately optimal level of antimicrobial use in the absence of antimicrobial
resistance;
• â(t) represents the socially optimal level of antimicrobial use in the absence of antimicrobial
resistance;
• a∗ (t) represents the privately optimal level of antimicrobial use when including antimicrobial
resistance dynamics; and
• â∗ (t) represents the socially optimal level of antimicrobial use when including antimicrobial
resistance dynamics.
We treat a(t)≡ a∗ (t) as identical terms since the private decision maker does not internalize
externalities in either case.
4 Indeed, if the disease grows exponentially and antimicrobials become increasingly ineffective, then it is hard to change
the path of disease growth (Bloom and Cadarette, 2019).
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From these optimal levels derived in the models, we make three conjectures about the private
and socially optimal levels of antimicrobial use under free ridership and antimicrobial resistance.
PROPOSITION 1. a(t)< â(t).
Private decision makers underprovide antimicrobials to their livestock compared with the social
optimum in the absence of antimicrobial resistance. This is a basic result of free ridership.
Proposition 1 follows from the comparison of first-order conditions of private and social-planner
problems, where substituting out costs yields
(7) va = vâ − λθâδ
which implies that va > vâ, since θâ < 0. Based on the concavity of the value function v(·), this
implies that â(t)> a(t) (see Appendix A for more details).
PROPOSITION 2. â∗ (t)≤ â(t) .
Proposition 2 follows from a similar comparison of the two social planner’s problems, where
substituting out costs yields
(8) vâ − λθâδ = vâ∗ − λθâ∗δ − µξâ∗
Given that µξâ∗ ≥ 0, we obtain vâ − λθâδ ≤ vâ∗ − λθâ∗δ . Given the assumptions on v(·) and θ (·)
outlined in the model, this inequality implies that vâ ≤ vâ∗ and λθâδ ≤ λθâ∗δ , which in turn implies
that â≥ â∗. That is, the socially optimal level of antimicrobial use when excluding antimicrobial
resistance from the model is at least as high as (and possibly higher than) the socially optimal
amount of antimicrobial use when including resistance dynamics.
PROPOSITION 3. Based on specific cases, one of the following is true:
1. a≤ â∗ ≤ â; or
2. â∗ < a < â.
One may observe that Proposition 3 follows directly from Appendix B and Propositions 1 and 2.
Following is a brief examination of each of the two cases in Proposition 3.
Case 1: This is the case when the relative size of the free-riding externality is greater than the
resistance externality; therefore, private antimicrobial use is less than or equal to the socially optimal
level with either externality.
Case 2: This is the case when the relative size of the free-riding externality is smaller than the
resistance externality; therefore, socially optimal antimicrobial use with both externalities is less
than private use, which is less than the socially optimal level with only the free-riding externality.
Broadly, Proposition 3 indicates that when antimicrobial resistance dynamics are incorporated
into the model, the socially optimal amount of antimicrobial use is (i) never greater than that in the
no-resistance model, (ii) may be lower than the privately optimal amount in the no-resistance model,
and (iii) may still be underprovided at the private level in the resistance model.
Figure 1 presents general graphical illustrations of the three propositions. The marginal private
and social benefits of antimicrobial use without accounting for antimicrobial resistance dynamics
are given by va and vâ, respectively. The marginal social benefit accounting for resistance dynamics,
vâ∗ , is uncertain. It will be less than the marginal social benefit without resistance dynamics, but it
is unclear where it will fall in relation to marginal private benefits without resistance dynamics.
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Figure 2. Phase Diagram for Initial Model with Free Riding But No Antimicrobial Resistance
Simulation
Given the model assumptions for the social planner problems, we construct phase diagrams in (a, p)
space examining the steady-state levels of antimicrobial use and (regional) disease prevalence in both
the no-resistance and the resistance cases. First, we must adopt some explicit functional forms and
add parameters that satisfy the assumptions of the model. This exercise allows us to compare steady-
state levels of antibiotic use and disease prevalence under the two alternative model specifications.
Parameterized Illustration
The slope and curvature of the ρ̇ = 0 and ȧ = 0 isoclines determine the steady-state equilibrium
and transition dynamics of regional disease prevalence and antimicrobial use (Figure 2). An upward
sloping ρ̇ = 0 isocline indicates that when disease prevalence is low (high), a small (large) amount of
antimicrobials will keep the change in disease prevalence steady at 0. Conversely, the ȧ = 0 isocline
slopes upwards, indicating that to maintain a steady state of no change in antimicrobial use over
time, higher levels of antimicrobial use correspond to higher levels of disease prevalence.
Taking the present-value Hamiltonian for the dynamic problem without antimicrobial resistance,
we use the maximum principle to solve for the steady-state equilibrium. We begin by isolating the ȧ
equation:
(9) ȧ =
−θaδvp + 2(va − c)θδp − vapθ
vaa − (va − c) θaaθa
.
Equation (3) provides us the ṗ equation. Next, we select functional forms that satisfy our prior
assumptions to demonstrate the transition dynamics as given in Table 1. The value function, v(a, p),
and associated parameters are chosen such that the optimality conditions are satisfied (i.e., va > 0,
vp < 0, vaa < 0 and vap > 0). Therefore, the chosen functional form is v(a, p) = aκ1 pκ2 − pκ3 , with
κ1 = 0.5, κ2 = 1 and κ3 = 2.5 Similarly, θ (a) = aκ5 , with κ5 =−0.25, is chosen such that it satisfied
the conditions set in the model (i.e., θa < 0 and θaa > 0), representing the notion that antimicrobial
use reduces disease prevalence at a decreasing rate. Additionally, δ (p) = pκ7 , with κ7 = 2, such that
δp > 0 and δpp > 0, representing the exponential path of growth of disease prevalence (Anderson,
May, and Anderson, 1992; Viboud, Simonsen, and Chowell, 2016). A multiplicatively separable
form of the disease dynamics constraint is used since it is highly tractable and emphasizes the
different effects that antimicrobial use and current levels of prevalence can have on changes in the
latter.
Using the functional forms in Table 1 and parameter values discussed previously, the initial
model (without resistance dynamics) can be solved numerically for given levels of a and p. Figure 2
5 A brief examination of the model’s sensitivity to small changes in the parameters follows.
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Table 1. Functional Form Selections for Parameterized Illustrations
Function No Resistance Dynamics Resistance Dynamics
Value of keeping livestock v(a, p) = aκ1 pκ2 − pκ3 v(a, p, I) = aκ1 pκ2 Iκ4 − pκ3
Antimicrobial effects on disease
prevalence
θ (a) = aκ5 θ (a, I) = aκ5 Iκ6
Independent rate of change in disease
prevalence
δ (p) = pκ7 δ (p) = pκ7
Antimicrobial effects on
antimicrobial resistance
ξ (a) = aκ8
plots the isoclines for ȧ = 0 and ṗ = 0. As long as the parameter values satisfy the assumptions of
the model, the qualitative results should be quite similar regardless of the parameters’ magnitudes.
If antimicrobial use and prevalence are both initially below their steady-state levels, it is possible
to converge on the steady-state equilibrium. However, if either exceeds its steady-state level, the
system will diverge from the steady state and both antimicrobial use and prevalence will increase ad
infinitum. The rationale behind this result is simple: If disease prevalence is too high at the beginning,
then no amount of antimicrobial use will allow the level of prevalence to stop changing over time.
Conversely, when antimicrobial use is too high, there is no way to reduce it without increasing the
level of disease prevalence.
Next, we add the antimicrobial resistance variable to the model along with its dynamic constraint
and derive the associated ȧ as
(10) ȧ =
−vapθδ − vaIξ + [vp − λδpθ ]θaδ + λθaIξ δ + λθaδpθδ + [vI − λθIδ ]ξa
vaa − µξaa − λθaaδ
.
Equations (5) and (6) provide us with ṗ and İ equations, respectively. In this case, there are three
variables—a, p, and I—so drawing a proper phase diagram requires a three-dimensional plot of
isoplanes. However, since we are only interested in differences from the initial steady state, we have
opted to fix antimicrobial resistance at different levels to illustrate changes in the same (a, p) space
as that used in the initial diagram. When antimicrobial resistance is fixed at different levels, we find
that the steady-state levels of antimicrobials and disease prevalence begin to shift.
Given that antimicrobial resistance is added in the model, we introduce some changes to the
functional forms. The value function in column 2 of Table 1, v(a, p, I) = aκ1 pκ2 Iκ4 − pκ3 , is chosen
such that it follows the optimality conditions laid out above (i.e., va > 0, vp < 0, vaa < 0 and vap > 0).
Additionally, the value function must also satisfy vI < 0 and vII > 0. That is, increases in levels of
antimicrobial resistance diminish the values from livestock keeping, and the value decreases at a
decreasing rate. Further, vaI < 0, which indicates that the marginal value of antimicrobials decreases
as resistance increases. To satisfy these assumptions, the value of κ1,κ2, and κ3 remain the same as
above, and the value of κ4 is set at −0.5.
Similarly, θ (a, I) = aκ5 Iκ6 is chosen such that the assumptions θa < 0 and θaa > 0 are satisfied.
Additionally, to account for an interaction between antimicrobial use and antimicrobial resistance,
we make the additional assumption that θaI < 0 (i.e., the marginal ability of antimicrobials to hamper
the growth of disease prevalence goes down as antimicrobial resistance goes up). We choose κ6 = 2
so that all the above-mentioned assumptions are satisfied; as before, κ5 =−0.25 and δ (p) remains
the same. Effects of antimicrobial use on antimicrobial resistance are modeled as ξ (a) = aκ8 ,
with κ8 = 1.5, such that ξa > 0 and ξaa > 0, indicating that the ineffectiveness of antimicrobials
is increasing in antimicrobial use at an increasing rate. This ensures that the new functions and
constraints in the resistance model satisfy the stated assumptions.
Figure 3 illustrates that as the level of antimicrobial ineffectiveness increases (at fixed levels,
as shown across the three panels), the corresponding steady-state levels of antimicrobial use and
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(a) I = 1 (b) I = 2
(c) I = 3
Figure 3. Phase Diagrams for Model with Free Riding and Resistance Externalities
disease prevalence decline. Figure 3 generates important economic insights. First, the higher the
antimicrobial ineffectiveness, the lower the disease prevalence level that will be sustainable in steady
state. In other words, it becomes increasingly difficult to curtail or manage a sustained level of
disease as resistance increases. This suggests that disease outbreak, spread, and severity could be
high under a scenario with high resistance.
Second, with higher levels of resistance, the ȧ = 0 isocline becomes more horizontal and
lower. This indicates that the rate of change in antimicrobial use in equilibrium must be much
higher to maintain a low level of disease prevalence in the presence of higher antimicrobial
resistance. This change in slope of the ȧ isocline again represents increasing costs of disease
management and therapy in the face of increasing resistance. More importantly, the equilibrium level
of antimicrobial use that is sustainable under the antimicrobial resistance framework is lower than
the level sustainable in the free-rider model. This parameterized illustration further demonstrates the
theoretical result in Proposition 2.
Sensitivity Analysis
Regarding the model’s sensitivity to changes in the parameters, we conduct a rudimentary analysis
to determine how the isoclines and the steady state shift with changes in individual parameter values.
Due to the localized nature of our equilibria—a necessary consequence of the intuitive assumptions
of our model—we find a sensitivity analysis of the parameterized model to be the most appropriate
method to determine the model’s robustness to minor changes. We examine parameter changes
ranging from 10% to 50% in either direction, subject to the functional form assumptions of the
model.
The initial model (without antimicrobial resistance) is not highly sensitive to changes in the
antimicrobial term’s exponent (κ1) in the value function. Shifts of 50% around the initial parameter
value leaves the isocline ṗ = 0 wholly unchanged. The isocline ȧ = 0 is altered only slightly, shifting
the steady state along the isocline ṗ = 0 either to the right when κ1 increases—indicating a higher
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(a) 50% Range around Initial κ5 (b) 25% Range around Initial κ7
Figure 4. Phase Diagrams for Initial Model with Free Riding but No Antimicrobial
Resistance with Parameter Value Ranges
steady-state level of antimicrobial use corresponding with a relatively small increase in disease
prevalence—or to the left when κ1 decreases—indicating a lower steady-state level of antimicrobial
use corresponding with a relatively small decrease in disease prevalence.
Large increases in the κ2 parameter—the exponent on the multiplicative prevalence component
of the value function—leaves the isocline ṗ = 0 unchanged, stretches the isocline ȧ = 0 vertically,
and reduces the steady-state level of antimicrobial use. Complete removal of that multiplicative
prevalence term (setting κ2 = 0) creates multiple stable equilibria, which are, while interesting from
a graphical standpoint, too unrealistic in practice to warrant further elaboration. The exponent on
the additive prevalence component of the value function (κ3) likewise leaves the isocline ṗ = 0
unaltered, and it shifts the isocline ȧ = 0 slightly to inversely raise or lower the steady-state level of
antimicrobial use.
Moving beyond the value function, we consider parameters in the dynamic constraints. While
a 10% increase in the value of κ5 (the exponent describing antimicrobials’ effect on disease
prevalence) has little effect on either isocline or the steady state, even the slightest decrease stretches
the isocline ȧ = 0 vertically and reduces the steady-state level of antimicrobial use. Figure 3(a)
illustrates a 50% change in this parameter value in either direction (by the dashed lines around the
isoclines). It is representative of how the isoclines tend to shift under parameter changes; however,
shifts in this parameter have more pronounced effects than shifts in most others. The isocline ṗ = 0 is
not highly sensitive to small changes in the exponent describing the independent growth of disease
prevalence (κ7); however, the isocline ȧ = 0 becomes steeper, with a 10% shift in the parameter
value (either direction), causing the steady-state level of disease prevalence and antimicrobial use to
be lower. Figure 3(b) illustrates a 25% range around the initial κ7 value, representing the reduction
in steady-state levels of disease prevalence and antimicrobial use stemming from any upward or
downward movement in this parameter value. The qualitative results remain consistent under a 25%
shift in this parameter value.
We conduct a similar exercise for our resistance model. Rather than provide a pedantic
explanation of each parameter, we focus on those that are specific to the resistance model. A shift of
up to 50% in either direction in κ4, the exponent on the ineffectiveness term in the value function,
shifts the phase diagram only minimally. On the other hand, a shift in the exponent on the resistance
dynamics constraint, κ8, has a more pronounced effect on the phase diagram. Though the qualitative
results and interpretation remain unchanged, we illustrate the effects in Figure 5. We can see that the
parameter change affects the steady-state equilibrium solely through the isocline ȧ = 0.
On the whole, the resistance model seems less sensitive to changes in the parameter values
than the model examining only free riding, though that sensitivity often increases as we modify
the resistance terms to higher static values (i.e., as I increases in the phase diagram). As long as
parameter values satisfy the functional form assumptions of the model, we find that parameter shifts
of at least 50% do not affect the qualitative results and interpretations of the model. Upon further
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Figure 5. Phase Diagrams for Model with Free Riding and Resistance Externalities with κ8
Ranging 50% Above and Below Initial Value
examination, we find that some parameter values in violation of the assumptions of the model lead
to discontinuities, multiple equilibria, and other model inconsistencies.
Policy Discussion
In our model, the optimal use of antimicrobials is determined by the relative size of the free-
riding and resistance externalities. Here, we discuss the implications of these results in light of
subsidy and voucher programs like the Tanzanian Acaricide Subsidy Program6 and Turkey’s Animal
Health Subsidy Program.7 These programs are structured to incentivize farmers to protect their
animals from disease risk, to promote growth and limit food insecurity, and to overcome free-riding
behaviors. We acknowledge that such programs may have been developed to enhance food security
by limiting livestock disease and increasing production, which may take precedence over judicious
use of antimicrobials, especially in low- and lower-middle income countries. However, evidence
suggests that ceasing growth promoting antimicrobials in animals may have negligible impacts on
production (Laxminarayan, Van Boeckel, and Teillant, 2015; Van Boeckel et al., 2015). Therefore,
such programs may allow for overuse of antimicrobials without many economic or food security
gains. Further, these policies could be detrimental to farmers’ ability to control disease losses in
the future through resistance development, leading to multiple crises in terms of animal health,
human health, and food insecurity. Our model emphasizes the need to recalibrate these policies by
incorporating antimicrobial resistance externalities in decision calculus.8
If a > â∗ (i.e., private antimicrobial use is greater than the socially optimal use with free-riding
and resistance externalities under disease dynamics) arises, then free riding may not be such a
6 http://www.snv.org/public/cms/sites/default/files/explore/download/brief_1_public_accountability_in_tanzania_pata_
initiative.pdf
7 https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent GAIN Publications/Turkish Livestock Support and Subsidies_Ankara_Turkey_8-12-
2015.pdf
8 This model also can motivate the problem of pest resistance in target species. However, policies to mitigate resistance in
bacteria and pests may differ.
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detrimental behavior, and it may in fact lead the economy closer to the socially optimal level of
antimicrobial use. We cite the two subsidy programs above specifically to motivate the presence of
such direct interventions; however, there are other policies that may be regarded as indirect subsidies
and can incentivize overuse much like direct subsidies.
Over-the-counter availability of antimicrobials without prescription can be regarded as a subsidy
on transaction costs and is a major issue in developing countries (Caudell et al., 2017). For example,
China’s pig production sector uses roughly 10 times more antibiotics than the United States and
yet the regulatory structure for antibiotics is not implemented effectively in all regions of China
(Elliott, 2015; Larson, 2015). Similarly, antimicrobial use and resistance is rapidly on the rise in
important emerging economies like India, Pakistan, and Mexico (Van Boeckel et al., 2015, 2019),
yet no regulatory or antimicrobial monitoring programs are in place for many of these countries.
In other important livestock producing countries like Brazil, action plans are only in their infancy
and not fully implemented (Cardoso, 2019). On the other hand, countries like Sweden have been
successful in dealing with the resistance externality through effective regulation of antimicrobials
and by consistently reducing their use in food animals without compromising growth or productivity
(Elliott, 2015).9 Lessons from these success stories could be applied to the livestock sectors of
emerging countries to deal with the burden of antimicrobial resistance while simultaneously ensuring
food security in low- and lower-middle income countries.
Over-the-counter availability and self-prescription of antimicrobials also leads to consumption of
more broad-spectrum antibiotics (Caudell et al., 2017; Ahmed et al., 2018) and may pose the threat
of more strains of bacteria becoming resistant more rapidly. These policies and the development
of resistant bacteria in the emerging economies may affect global food security and health through
trade and travel in an interconnected world (Frost et al., 2019). Therefore, it is important that these
resistance externalities are addressed locally as well as globally (Kirchhelle et al., 2020). Indeed,
considering the global dimension of antimicrobial resistance, multiple international organizations
like the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), and
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), among others, have made this
topic a priority (Rushton, Ferreira, and Stärk, 2014).
The case a > â∗ (i.e., private antimicrobial use being greater than the socially optimal use with
free-riding and resistance externalities) also mirrors the case in most developed countries with
intensive production systems (like the United States) and little incentive to free ride (Levy, 1998;
Orzech and Nichter, 2008). In developed countries, while regulatory structures and monitoring
programs are in place, they are generally in their infancy, and antimicrobial consumption in food
animals far exceeds their direct consumption by humans (Elliott, 2015).
Now we turn our attention to the other case, where the relative size of the free-riding externality
is greater than the resistance externality (i.e., when â∗ < a). In such a case, incentives may be
required to deal with underprovision of livestock health inputs. The free-riding externality is likely
to be greater for farmers who experience credit constraints or reside in areas with limited access
to veterinary services and low availability of antimicrobials (Marsh et al., 2016; Railey et al.,
2018). Even in such a scenario, policy makers should account for the antimicrobial resistance
externality; otherwise, they may end up overincentivizing the use of antimicrobials, which could
be harmful in the long run. Further data collection is required to measure these externalities and
prescribe incentives to increase or decrease antimicrobial use according to the relative sizes of these
externalities.
Phase diagrams generated by our simulations also point toward important economic aspects of
increasing resistance levels. Figure 3 illustrates how increases in antimicrobial resistance reduce
9 We acknowledge that the increase in antimicrobial use and resistance may also be related to intensification of production
systems in the developing world as a response to increase in demand for animal-sourced proteins (among other factors).
However, given that there is empirical evidence of increased resistance and emerging regional hotspots in low and lower-
middle income countries (Van Boeckel et al., 2019), it is important that the issue of antimicrobial resistance is addressed
through regulatory frameworks.
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the steady state p∗ but increase the steady state a∗, suggesting that disease prevalence becomes
increasingly difficult to keep in check with an increasing burden of antimicrobial resistance, and
more antibiotic use is required to keep a lower level of disease sustainable. This result is in line with
the existing literature on antimicrobial resistance and has implications for lengths, severity, and costs
of disease outbreaks and ultimately food security and global health (Rushton, Ferreira, and Stärk,
2014; Friedman, Temkin, and Carmeli, 2016; Bloom and Cadarette, 2019).
Concluding Remarks
The countervailing effects of free-riding and resistance externalities in antimicrobial use in a
smallholder setting may result in suboptimal levels of disease control, which in turn may lead
to high disease prevalence due either to a lack of livestock health inputs or to reductions in the
inputs’ effectiveness. This paper examines the optimal level of preventive antimicrobial use under
free-riding incentives given antimicrobial effectiveness, which we have modeled as nonrenewable
resource in a dynamic optimization framework. The first model is a standard model with free-riding
incentives that elucidates the effects of free riding on antimicrobial use given disease dynamics. We
then add antimicrobial resistance as a dynamic constraint and compare the two models, examining
several cases conditional on the extent of both externalities. Policy implications were discussed in
light of the animal health and disease control subsidy programs.
This paper contributes to the literature of antimicrobial use in the smallholder setting by
modeling the free-riding and resistance externalities simultaneously. If policy makers fail to account
for both of these externalities and instead account only for free ridership, the resulting policies could
aim to overprovide antimicrobials relative to the true socially optimal levels including resistance
dynamics. If pathogens become resistant to antimicrobials, future costs of disease will rise in terms
of disease management as shown via our phase diagrams but also likely through increased mortality
and increased duration of illness. Further, increased antimicrobial resistance would undermine both
public health and future food security. Therefore, the paper emphasizes the need to align the private
benefits of antimicrobial use with the social benefits of these inputs, accounting fully for free riders
and increasing levels of disease resistance associated with antimicrobial use.
[First submitted June 2020; accepted for publication October 2020.]
504 September 2021 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
References
Ahmed, H., D. R. Call, R. J. Quinlan, and J. K. Yoder. “Relationships between Livestock Grazing
Practices, Disease Risk, and Antimicrobial Use among East African Agropastoralists.”
Environment and Development Economics 23(2018):80–97. doi: 10.1017/S1355770X17000341.
Althouse, B. M., T. C. Bergstrom, and C. T. Bergstrom. “A Public Choice Framework for
Controlling Transmissible and Evolving Diseases.” Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 107(2010):1696–1701. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0906078107.
Anderson, R. M., R. M. May, and B. Anderson. Infectious Diseases of Humans: Dynamics and
Control. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Bauch, C. T., and D. J. D. Earn. “Vaccinations and the Theory of Games.” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 101(2004):13,391–13,394. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0403823101.
Bloom, D. E., and D. Cadarette. “Infectious Disease Threats in the Twenty-First Century:
Strengthening the Global Response.” Frontiers in Immunology 10(2019):549. doi: 10.3389/
fimmu.2019.00549.
Bowen, H. R. “The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 58(1943):27–48. doi: 10.2307/1885754.
Brown, G., and D. F. Layton. “Resistance Economics: Social Cost and the Evolution of Antibiotic
Resistance.” Environment and Development Economics 1(1996):349–355. doi: 10.1017/
S1355770X0000067X.
Cardoso, M. “Antimicrobial Use, Resistance and Economic Benefits and Costs to Livestock
Producers in Brazil.” OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers 135, OECD Publishing,
Paris, France, 2019. doi: 10.1787/27137b1e-En.
Carlet, J., V. Jarlier, S. Harbarth, A. Voss, H. Goossens, and D. Pittet. “Ready for a World without
Antibiotics? The Pensières Antibiotic Resistance Call to Action.” Antimicrobial Resistance and
Infection Control 1(2012):11. doi: 10.1186/2047-2994-1-11.
Caudell, M. A., M. B. Quinlan, M. Subbiah, D. R. Call, C. J. Roulette, J. W. Roulette, A. Roth,
L. Matthews, and R. J. Quinlan. “Antimicrobial Use and Veterinary Care among Agro-
Pastoralists in Northern Tanzania.” PLOS ONE 12(2017):e0170,328. doi: 10.1371/journal.
pone.0170328.
Elbasha, E. H. “Deadweight Loss of Bacterial Resistance Due to Overtreatment.” Health
Economics 12(2003):125–138. doi: 10.1002/hec.702.
Elliott, K. A. “Antibiotics on the Farm: AgricultureâĂŹs Role in Drug Resistance.” CGD Policy
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Appendix A: No Antimicrobial Resistance




[v(a(t) , p(t))− ca(t)]e−rtdt;
s.t. ṗ = θ (a(t))δ (p(t)) ;
p(0) = p0.
Private households maximize present value Hamiltonian:
H = v(a, p)− ca− λθ (a)δ (p) .
The maximum principle for private decision maker (not internalizing the constraint) gives the
following:
Ha = va − c = 0 (first-order condition)
λ̇ = vp − λθδp (portfolio balance condition)
ṗ = θδ (dynamic constraint)
The social planner’s problem in which the benevolent planner internalizes the reduction in disease
persistence that comes from antimicrobial use gives use the following:
Ha = va − c− λθaδ = 0 (first-order condition)
λ̇ = vp − λθδp (portfolio balance condition)
ṗ = θδ (dynamic constraint)
With the aggregate private antimicrobial use denoted as a and the socially optimal as â, we can
compare the private and social first-order conditions:
va − c = vâ − c− λθâδ
va = vâ − λθâδ
which implies that va > vâ, since θâ < 0. Based on the concavity of the value function v(·), this
implies â > a. In other words, private antimicrobial use will be lower than the socially optimal level,
so the market is inefficient in providing antimicrobials.
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Appendix B: Antimicrobial Resistance





[v(a(t) , p(t) , I (t))− ca(t)]e−rtdt
s.t. ṗ = θ (a(t) , I (t))δ (p(t))
İ = ξ (a(t))
I (0) = I0, p(0) = p0 and I ∈ [0, Ī]
Private household with antimicrobial resistance
H = v(a, p, I)− ca− λ [θ (a, I)δ (p)]− µ [ξ (a)]
The maximum principle gives the following:
Ha = va − c = 0 (first-order condition)
λ̇ = vp − λθ (a, I)δp (portfolio balance condition 1)
µ̇ = vI − λθIδ (portfolio balance condition 2)
ṗ = θ (a, I)δ (dynamic constraint 1)
İ = ξ (a) (dynamic constraint 2)
The social planner internalizes the effects of antimicrobial use on disease prevalence and
antimicrobial ineffectiveness. Solving the social planner’s problem gives the following:
Ha = va − c− λθa p− µξa = 0 (first-order condition)
λ̇ = vp − λθ (a, I)δp (portfolio balance condition 1)
µ̇ = vI − λθI p (portfolio balance condition 2)
ṗ = θ (a, I)δ (dynamic constraint 1)
İ = ξ (a) (dynamic constraint 2)
We cannot directly compare the two socially optimal choices of antimicrobials since there are
multiple unknowns in each, but we can compare them indirectly using the private problem.
Considering antimicrobial use in the resistance case as â∗ and the private case as a∗, we have
va∗ − c = vâ∗ − c− λθâ∗δ − µξâ∗
va∗ = vâ∗ − λθâ∗δ − µξâ∗
Recalling that θâ∗ < 0 and ξâ∗ > 0, we have the following cases:
1. va∗ ≥ vâ∗ if |λθâ∗δ | ≥ |µξâ∗ |, which implies that a∗ ≤ â∗; and
2. va∗ < vâ∗ if |λθâ∗δ |< |µξâ∗ |, which implies that a∗ > â∗.
This allows for the construction of the conditional propositions (especially Proposition 3).
